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Colunga: When the Supreme Court Departs from Its Traditional Function

WHEN THE SUPREME COURT DEPARTS
FROM ITS TRADITIONAL FUNCTION
Isaac J. Colunga*
I. INTRODUCTION
Generally, state courts can offer more protections under their own
state laws than under the Federal Constitution. 1 Sometimes, however,
state courts extend that sentiment to decisions based solely on federal
law. They do so either by interpreting the Federal Constitution more
broadly or perhaps by adding their own state requirements to a federal
question. What results is ―a competing constitutional vision,‖ through
which state courts fill the void where federal laws fail to adequately
protect their citizens‘ civil rights.
But these decisions are not
unyielding.2
Starting in the late-1970s, the United States Supreme Court began
reversing state court judgments that applied an expansive interpretation
of federal law in favor of state citizens. In doing so, the Supreme Court
strayed from its traditional role. In those instances that it reversed the
state court judgments, it did not expound new law, it did not curtail state
officials from mistreating defendants, and it did not ensure that a person
who sought to vindicate a federal right had been properly heard.
Instead, the Supreme Court simply reviewed the facts of each case and
found fault with the state court‘s application of federal law.3 This
happened most recently in Michigan v. Fisher.4
The author serves as a law clerk to the Honorable Charles R. Norgle of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
1
See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 44 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (―It is
incumbent on a state court, therefore, when it determines that its State‘s laws call for
protection more complete than the Federal Constitution demands, to be clear about its
ultimate reliance on state law.‖); State v. Debooy, 996 P.2d 546, 549 (Utah 2000) (―[W]e have
stated that we will not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different construction [than
the U.S. Constitution] where doing so will more appropriately protect the rights of this
state‘s citizens.‖); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) (advocating that state courts should have
the opportunity to provide more protections under their state laws); cf. David J. Robinson,
Admissibility of Government Wiretaps After People v. Coleman, 98 ILL. B.J. 44, 45 (Jan. 2010)
(―The crucial distinction between the Illinois proscription against eavesdropping and its
federal counterpart is that under the Illinois statute, both parties to the conversation must
agree to have their conversation recorded, while under the federal statute only one party
need consent.‖).
2
Justin R. Long, Demosprudence, Interactive Federalism, and Twenty Years of Sheff v.
O‘Neill, 42 CONN. L. REV. 585, 588 (2009) (citing Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional
Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 95 (2000)).
3
Vincent Martin Bonventre, Changing Roles: The Supreme Court and the State High Courts
in Safeguarding Rights, 70 ALB. L. REV. 841, 846–50 (2007) (collecting cases in which the
*
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There, the Supreme Court overruled a state court decision that
employed an expansive interpretation of the emergency aid doctrine,
thus concluding that local authorities, despite what the state courts said,
had not violated the defendant‘s Fourth Amendment rights. 5 Critics
maintain that this sort of appellate review has dramatically altered the
relationship between state tribunals and the Supreme Court. 6 Thus,
using Michigan v. Fisher as a primary example, this article attempts to
explain how this relationship has been altered.
Warrantless searches have long been the subject of intense
courtroom drama. Traditionally they are not allowed and even
abhorred,7 unless of course the facts of a particular case justify the
application of one of the few exceptions to their bar. 8 But if the facts do
not support an exception, a defendant more often than not can stave off
conviction by moving to quash any evidence that the state may have
acquired through the warrantless search. There is nothing unique about
this scenario, as it is played out routinely in state and federal courtrooms
across the country.
What is unique, however, is the set of circumstances that underlies
each case. Typically, when considering a motion to quash based on an
unlawful search, the trial court will conduct an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the police officers involved in the incident entered

Supreme Court found fault with state court decisions to protect their citizens‘ liberties
excessively).
4
130 S. Ct. 546 (2009).
5
Id. at 549 (explaining that ―[t]he Michigan Court of Appeals required more than what
the Fourth Amendment demands‖).
6
See Bonventre, supra note 3, at 846; see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1069 (1983)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (―Until recently we had virtually no interest in cases of this type.‖).
Stevens is referring to cases in which the state courts did not mistreat its citizen, but
protected him or her under federal law. Long, 463 U.S. at 1068–69 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004) (explaining that it is a ―‗basic principle of
Fourth Amendment law‘ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable‖); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971)
(stating that ―a search or seizure carried out on a suspect‘s premises without a warrant is
per se unreasonable, unless the police can show‖ an exception); see also United States v. U.S.
Dist. Court (Plamondon), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (―[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed . . . .‖).
8
See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984) (clarifying that courts have
recognized only a few emergency exceptions that justify warrantless searches); see also
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (finding warrantless entry justified where
ongoing fire was present); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976) (holding that
hot pursuit of a fleeing felon justifies a warrant search); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 770–71 (1966) (noting that officers may enter a home without a warrant to impede the
destruction of evidence).
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the defendant‘s home lawfully.9 At this point the state usually argues
that an exception applies justifying the warrantless search. On the other
hand, the defendant argues that the alleged exception does not apply
making the officers‘ search an intrusion on the defendant‘s privacy. The
trial court may consider not only the physical circumstances of each case
but also the intent of the police officers, which the parties may establish
using oral testimony and perhaps a detailed description of the scene. 10
With this backdrop, the trial court makes credibility determinations,
considers the effectiveness of the parties‘ witnesses, and ultimately
decides the issue while the evidence is fresh in its mind.
On appeal, the process is one step removed. The parties and the
court essentially rely on a lifeless record, through which the losing party
challenges the trial judge‘s findings, while the appellate court reviews
the circumstances and testimony anew using two different standards of
review. As to the trial court‘s factual findings, the standard is clear
error.11 And as to the trial court‘s legal conclusions, the standard is de
novo.12 Either way, the parties will characterize the evidence in the light
most favorable to their clients. The state again argues for an exception,
and the defendant again takes the opposing view.
Now, let us say that in the above scenario the state trial court and
appellate courts all found that the local authorities violated the
defendant‘s rights—that the warrantless search was unfounded, no
exception applied, and that the evidence obtained pursuant to the
unlawful search had to be quashed. Put another way, the state trial and
appellate courts found that federal law protected the defendant citizen
9
E.g., Brittany H. Southerland, Note, Lying To Catch the Bad Guy: The Eleventh Circuit’s
Likely Adoption of the Clear Error Standard of Review for A Denial of a Franks Hearing, 24 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 843, 855 (2008) (explaining that in challenging a search warrant, the Eleventh
Circuit, for one, recognizes that holding an evidentiary hearing lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court); see also People v. Fisher, No. 256027, 2005 WL 3481454, at *1
(Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005) (―A court deciding a suppression motion must ordinarily
convene its own evidentiary hearing to decide the matter.‖).
10
Matthew Bell, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness: Why Utah Courts Should Embrace the
Community Caretaking Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 10 BOALT J. CRIM. L. 3, 39 (2005)
(―As a general rule, courts evaluate ‗challenged searches under a standard of objective
reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers
involved.‘‖). Bell goes on to explain that, in California, the trial courts consider the officers‘
motivation, in addition to their intent. Id. If the officers intended to solve a crime in
conducting the search, the community-caretaking exception does not apply. Id.; see also
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (noting that ―the circumstances, viewed
objectively,‖ may justify the officer‘s actions).
11
People v. Fisher, No. 276439, 2008 WL 786515, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2008) (―In
reviewing a trial court‘s decision following a suppression hearing, we review the trial
court‘s factual findings for clear error, but review the legal conclusions de novo.‖).
12
Id.
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from the improper acts of a state actor.13 What can the state‘s attorney
argue in response if indeed the state tribunals have interpreted the
defendant‘s constitutional rights too broadly? Having exhausted its
remedies in the state appellate courts, the state‘s only remaining forum
in which to challenge the ruling is the United States Supreme Court.
And in Michigan v. Fisher, that is precisely what the State of Michigan
did.
This Article examines the ramifications of these types of challenges,
which in the end do not curtail the states from imposing an
unconstitutional burden on their citizens. 14 Rather, they curtail the states
from providing their citizens greater protections under the Fourth
Amendment. To illustrate this point, Part II will review briefly the
concepts underlying the Fourth Amendment while comparing the
federal requirements to prove the emergency aid exception to a
warrantless search with the requirements in state court. With this
background in mind, Part III will conduct a close examination of
Michigan v. Fisher, recounting the specific facts of the case and, of course,
the Court‘s ultimate disposition. Part IV considers rather closely Justice
Stevens‘ dissent in Michigan v. Fisher, which critiques the Supreme
Court‘s recent trend. This section provides the reader with a unique look
at the clash between the uniformity in federal law and the necessary
constitutional protections proffered by the state courts. In the end, this
article sides with Justice Stevens and argues, quite simply, that the
Supreme Court‘s review of these cases is needless.
II. COMMUNITY-CARETAKING, EMERGENCY AID, AND WARRANTLESS
SEARCHES
At the core of the Fourth Amendment15 is the security of one‘s right
to privacy and the requirement of a warrant to conduct a search of one‘s
home and effects. In Katz v. United States, Justice Stewart affirmed ―that
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1068 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (clarifying
that certain search and seizure cases involve the state upholding a citizen‘s right, ―finding
the citizen to be protected under both federal and state law‖); cf. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d
1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) (―[C]hoosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different
construction may prove to be an appropriate method for insulating this state‘s citizens
from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the [F]ourth [A]mendment by the
federal courts.‖).
14
See Long, 463 U.S. at 1069 (explaining that the Court‘s prior inquiries involved making
sure that the states did not vitiate their citizens‘ constitutional rights).
15
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (―The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.‖).
13
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searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.‖16 This famous pronouncement is conventionally
known as the ―warrant preference theory‖ 17 of the Fourth Amendment,
which confirms that warrantless searches are presumptively
unreasonable provided an exception does not exist. After Katz, scholars
usually discussed the theory in the context of traditional criminal
investigations, wherein law enforcement officials were acting in an effort
to stop individuals that were suspected of having committed a crime. 18
At the same time, a growing debate surrounded law enforcement
officers‘ other duties, those that did not involve investigating crimes, but
protecting and serving the public. 19
For example, officers are often called upon to assist motorists with
broken down vehicles, to mediate noise disputes, to respond to stray
animals, or to render aid to a sick pedestrian.20 For the most part, these
activities are entirely non-investigatory and fall outside of the crimecontrol paradigm. Even still, in many instances these activities involve
intrusions into individuals‘ homes, vehicles, or businesses. 21
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating that warrantless searches are
unreasonable, though ―subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions‖) (citing several cases in which the Supreme Court ―emphasized that the
mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes‖) (alteration
in original).
17
Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 262 (noting the ―warrant theory‖ or ―warrant preference theory‖).
18
Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community Caretaking, Assistance Searches,
and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 1486 (2009) (explaining
that crime-stopping ―forms the backdrop for much of our thought about policework and
underlies much Fourth Amendment doctrine‖) (footnote omitted).
19
Bell, supra note 10, at 3; see also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (―Local
police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which
there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be
described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection,
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.‖). See
generally PETER K. MANNING, POLICE WORK: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF POLICING (2d
ed. 1997) (discussing some of the other tasks that police officers are charged with, including
helping citizens, maintaining order and the smooth flow of traffic and pedestrians, and
routine patrol).
20
See Livingston, supra note 17, at 272 (listing a host of activities that constitute
―community caretaking‖ functions).
21
See id. at 261 (describing an example in which police officers entered an apartment to
render aid to a woman that was having a baby). Livingston further explains that ―[i]t is not
uncommon for police to intrude into the homes of elderly people in response to calls from
anxious relatives unable to locate them‖ and that ―[p]olice in many places routinely enter
commercial premises found inexplicably open at night to secure the premises and to notify
the owners that their property has been left vulnerable to invasion.‖ Id. at 272–73.
16
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Recognizing this, the federal courts sought to clarify whether police
officers enjoyed an exception to the warrant requirement in those
instances that they entered or searched a car, residence, or commercial
premises when acting as a ―community-caretaker‖ as opposed to an
investigator or crime-stopper.22
Over time, courts operating under the warrant preference theory
―have validated many community caretaking intrusions of this type on
the ground that they fall within variously formulated ‗exigent
circumstances,‘ ‗emergency,‘ and ‗rescue‘ exceptions to the probablecause-and-warrant formula.‖23 So much is true, though we need not
consider the nuances of each of these exceptions. Rather, because the
focus of this inquiry centers on the Supreme Court‘s decision in Michigan
v. Fisher, it is important that we consider the primary exception to the
warrant requirement in that case—the emergency aid exception.
A. Emergency Aid Exception
The emergency aid doctrine originated in dictum found in Johnson v.
United States, where Justice Jackson said, ―[t]here are exceptional
circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law
enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a
magistrate‘s warrant for search may be dispensed with.‖ 24 Since that
time the Supreme Court has stated, in clearer terms, that the emergency
aid doctrine allows law enforcement officers to enter a residence or other
establishment without a warrant so that they may render emergency aid
to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent harm or
injury.25 This conduct is justified, said the Supreme Court, in light of the

Courts have viewed the authority to enter a premises in response to cries for help as
―inherent in the very nature of their duties as peace officers.‖ United States v. Barone, 330
F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1964); see also Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.
1963) (―[A] warrant is not required to break down a door to enter a burning home to rescue
occupants or extinguish a fire, to prevent a shooting or to bring emergency aid to an
injured person.‖).
23
Livingston, supra note 17, at 276.
24
333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1947); see also Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 1971)
(noting that the emergency aid doctrine ―had its origin in a dictum enunciated by Justice
Jackson‖). The Supreme Court later gave us an example of one possible emergency
situation in which the doctrine would apply, such as ―where the officers, passing by on the
street, hear a shot and a cry for help and demand entrance [to a residence] in the name of
the law.‖ McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948).
25
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978); see also Root, 438 F.2d at 364 (―[T]he
emergency or exigency doctrine may be stated as follows: police officers may enter a
dwelling without a warrant to render emergency aid and assistance to a person whom they
reasonably believe to be in distress and in need of that assistance.‖).
22
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underlying and well-recognized need to protect or preserve life. 26 This
need is so compelling, in fact, that at least one court has suggested that
police officers have an affirmative duty to act in emergency situations. 27
In line with this reasoning, while recognizing the need to protect and
preserve life, numerous federal and state courts have upheld warrantless
entries in emergency situations.28
What is more, in applying the emergency aid exception, some courts
consider it a variation of the exigent circumstances exception, while
others see it as a subcategory of the community-caretaking doctrine. 29
This distinction is important. Community-caretaking, unlike traditional
crimefighting, does not require a showing of probable cause. On the
other hand, to validate a warrantless entry under the exigent
circumstances exception, the state is required to show the existence of
both probable cause and exigency.30 This is a much heavier burden for
the state, especially if law enforcement officers conducted a warrantless
entry to stop a minor offense. 31 Thus, when determining whether the

Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392; United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2002)
(discussing Mincey, but first observing, ―[t]he most urgent emergency situation excusing
police compliance with the warrant requirement is, of course, the need to protect or
preserve life‖); see also State v. Frankel, 847 A.2d 561, 568 (N.J. 2004) (―The emergency aid
doctrine is derived from the commonsense understanding that exigent circumstances may
require public safety officials, such as the police . . . to enter a dwelling without a warrant
for the purpose of protecting or preserving life, or preventing serious injury.‖).
27
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118 (2006) (―[I]t would be silly to suggest that the
police would commit a tort by entering [a residence] . . . to determine whether violence (or
threat of violence) has just occurred or is about to (or soon will) occur . . . .‖); see also Barone,
330 F.2d at 545 (―Indeed it is obvious that had the patrolmen been denied entry to the
apartment they would have had the right, if not the duty, to gain entry forcibly.‖); Wayne,
318 F.2d at 213 (noting ―that the police had a right—if not a duty—to assume‖ that an
emergency was taking place and that they should intervene).
28
See United States v. Hughes, 993 F.2d 1313, 1315 (7th Cir. 1993) (allowing warrantless
entry where police responded to a report that a woman and child were in danger in a crack
house); United States v. Gillenwaters, 890 F.2d 679, 682 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding warrantless
entry justified where police enter in response to a stabbing victim); United States v. Martin,
781 F.2d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding entry based on explosion in apartment); Mann
v. Cannon, 731 F.2d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 1984) (allowing search where children had open access
to controlled substances); United States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638, 643 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding
entry justified so that police could give emergency aid to someone they had just shot);
Johnson v. State, 386 So. 2d 302, 304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (allowing search where police
responded to a report of a dead body); State v. Carlson, 548 N.W.2d 138, 143 (Iowa 1996)
(finding search justified when police acted pursuant to missing person report).
29
Bell, supra note 10, at 16.
30
E.g., Bates v. Harvey, 518 F.3d 1233, 1245 (11th Cir. 2008).
31
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1984) (―[T]he police bear a heavy burden
when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or
arrests.‖). The Supreme Court in Welsh went on to state that the necessity for a search
without a warrant, pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception, is significantly
26
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emergency aid exception applies to a warrantless search, the question is
not whether the officer acted with probable cause when he or she
entered the premises, but whether the officer acted reasonably when
entering the premises to render aid or to protect an occupant. 32
Reasonableness is the keystone of the emergency aid exception. A
reviewing court may frame the inquiry as follows: when entering the
premises, ―[g]iven the known facts, would a prudent and reasonable
officer have perceived a need to act in the proper discharge of his or her
community caretaking functions?‖33 If the court answers this question in
the affirmative, the warrantless search is usually justified under the
emergency aid exception.
B. The Officers’ Intent
Let us observe the above question from another perspective. A plain
reading of the question reveals a second caveat beyond reasonableness—
the officer‘s perception. This realization prompted many courts to begin
the reasonableness inquiry with the question of what exactly the officer
perceived. The officer‘s state of mind when conducting the search gave
courts a clue as to whether the officer‘s conduct was indeed reasonable.
Working under this construct in United States v. Barone, the Second
Circuit hinted that the emergency aid exception would not apply to cases
in which officers entered the premises with the intent to search and
arrest.34 So, if an officer intended to search a residence pursuant to his or
her investigatory or crime-solving duties, then the emergency aid
exception would not apply and the state would have to justify the search
outside of the exception‘s confines.35
diminished when the gravity of the offense in progress is trivial, or does not involve
violence or threats of violence. 466 U.S. at 75152.
32
Bell, supra note 10, at 16 (―This analytical distinction also explains why courts do not
require probable cause when evaluating community caretaking acts including rendering
emergency aid; instead the inquiry is governed by the Fourth Amendment mandate that
officers act reasonably.‖).
33
People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 937 (Cal. 1999).
34
330 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1964) (―The right of the police to enter and investigate in an
emergency without the accompanying intent to either search or arrest is inherent in the very
nature of their duties as peace officers, and derives from the common law.‖) (emphasis
added).
35
Alison Sanders, Note, Constitutional Law: State v. Nemeth—The Community Caretaker
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 32 N.M. L. REV. 291, 298 (2002). In explaining the
community-caretaking exception in New Mexico, Sanders states that for the exception to
apply, ―[t]he sole motivation for entering the dwelling must be a non-criminal-related
community caretaking function, and the officer can do no more than what is reasonably
necessary to determine whether someone needs assistance and to provide that assistance.‖
Id. It is worth mentioning that the court in State v. Nemeth was concerned that if the intent

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss1/3

Colunga: When the Supreme Court Departs from Its Traditional Function

2010]

When the Supreme Court Departs

55

In line with this decision, many courts established a three-factor test
to determine whether the emergency aid exception applied, many of
which included a factor that turned on the officer‘s intent. For example,
in the oft-cited case People v. Mitchell, the New York Court of Appeals
summarized the basic elements of the emergency aid exception as
follows:
(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe
that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate
need for their assistance for the protection of life or
property.
(2) The search must not be primarily
motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. (3)
There must be some reasonable basis, approximating
probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area
or place to be searched.36
Using this sort of test, intent becomes a crucial part of the analysis. In
the end if the court finds that an officer was acting as a crime-fighter, not
as a community-caretaker, the exception does not apply.
All of this changed, however, after the United States Supreme
Court‘s decision in Brigham City v. Stuart.37 In Brigham City, the Court
recognized a gaping disparity in the standards used by both state and
federal courts when determining the validity of warrantless searches in
an emergency situation. Thus, it sought to articulate ―the appropriate
Fourth Amendment standard‖ that courts would use in their analyses
from then on.38
The case involved a scuffle that broke out at approximately 3:00 a.m.
inside the home of a Brigham City, Utah resident.39 Authorities
dispatched four officers to the home in response to a call about a loud
party.40 As the officers arrived, they heard shouting coming from inside;
thus, they ―proceeded down the driveway to investigate.‖41 Behind the
element had not been established, law enforcement officers could use the emergency aid
exception as a pretext for unjustified, warrantless searches. State v. Nemeth, 23 P.3d 936,
945 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
36
347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. 1976). ―The second requirement is related to the first in that
the protection of human life or property in imminent danger must be the motivation for the
search rather than the desire to apprehend a suspect or gather evidence for use in a
criminal proceeding.‖ Id. at 610.
37
547 U.S. 398 (2006).
38
Id. at 402. The Court referenced state and federal cases and quoted the different
standards used by each court to illustrate the disparity. Id.
39
Id. at 400.
40
Id. at 40001.
41
Id. at 401.
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home, the officers entered the backyard and observed, through a screen
door and two windows, a fight taking place inside.42 One of the officers
witnessed four individuals trying to restrain a juvenile but having
trouble doing so.43 The juvenile then broke free and punched one of the
individuals in the face.44 After the punch, the officers saw the victim spit
blood into a nearby sink, and, as he did so, the other individuals
restrained the attacker who continued to struggle, pushing him firmly
against a refrigerator.45 At that point, the officers took action.
One of the officers initially pushed open the screen door and
announced his presence, but amidst the fracas nobody noticed. The
officers then entered the kitchen and announced their presence again.
This agitated the individuals because the officers had entered the
Finally, despite the individuals‘
residence without permission. 46
opposition, the officers entered the fray and arrested the individuals and
charged them with ―contributing to the delinquency of a minor,
disorderly conduct, and intoxication.‖47
1.

Considering Intent in the Utah Supreme Court

In the Utah trial court, the individuals moved to suppress all
evidence obtained after the officers entered the residence without the
individuals‘ permission. Their argument was a familiar one: because
the officers lacked either a warrant or consent to enter the home, the
officers‘ entry violated the Fourth Amendment. 48 As it turned out, the
state trial court agreed with the defendants. The State appealed to the
Utah Court of Appeals. Again the defendants were successful. 49 With
that, the State took the case to the Utah Supreme Court, which again
sided with the defendants.
In affirming the Utah Court of Appeals, the Utah Supreme Court
first noted that its goal of providing practitioners with useful guidance in
search and seizure cases is often ―handicapped‖ because practitioners,
for some reason, commonly fail to challenge the underlying search by

Id.
Id. (characterizing the person being restrained as a ―juvenile‖). The Utah trial court
noted in its Order that the officers had probable cause to enter the backyard of the home
because they observed through a slat fence two juveniles drinking alcohol in the backyard.
Brigham City v. Stuart, 57 P.3d 1111, 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 2002).
44
Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 401.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
42
43
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way of the Utah Constitution.50 This was surprising, said the Utah
Supreme Court, because while Utah courts often interpreted the state
constitutional bar to warrantless searches similarly to the federal bar, the
protections under state law were or could be greater than those
guaranteed under federal law.51 With this preface, the Utah high court
took up two issues on appeal: (1) whether the officers‘ warrantless entry
was justified under the emergency aid doctrine, and (2) whether the facts
of the case were sufficient to present exigent circumstances.52 As to the
first inquiry, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the appellate court‘s
determination pursuant to Utah‘s three-prong test, which, like the test
found in People v. Mitchell,53 required a finding that ―[t]he search [was]
not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.‖54
At the center of the high court‘s analysis was the degree of harm that
the home‘s occupant suffered or would have suffered at the point the
officers entered the home. 55 The Utah Supreme Court stressed that if a
reviewing court found that the occupant‘s injuries were minor, the
necessity to conduct a warrantless entry to render aid is diminished;
thus, the emergency aid exception would not apply. 56 With this in mind,
the Utah high court turned to the trial record, which revealed that just
before the officers entered the home, a juvenile inside punched another
individual in the face before the other occupants subdued him. 57 This, of
course, resulted in relatively minor injuries to the occupant, with almost
no chance that the occupant would suffer further injury. The Utah
Supreme Court then concluded that the state could not invoke the
Brigham City v. Stuart, 122 P.3d 506, 510 (Utah 2005) (―Our aspiration to provide
useful guidance to those charged with the day-to-day responsibility of putting search and
seizure law into practice is handicapped by the manner in which search and seizure cases
are presented to us.‖).
51
Id. The Utah Supreme Court added the following statement with respect to
practitioners‘ failure to present challenges under the Utah Constitution:
Where the parties do not raise or adequately brief state constitutional
issues, our holdings become inevitably contingent. They carry within
them an implicit qualification that if properly invited to intervene, our
state‘s Declaration of Rights might change the result and impose
different demands on police officers and others who in a very real
sense are the everyday guardians of constitutional guarantees against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Id.
52
Id. at 512.
53
347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. 1976).
54
Brigham City, 122 P.3d at 512–13 (listing the elements that rendered lawful a
warrantless entry under the emergency aid doctrine).
55
Id. at 513.
56
Id. (―Consequently, intrusions to administer aid to less severe injuries may render
unconstitutional a search or seizure made incident to the warrantless entry.‖).
57
Id.
50
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emergency aid doctrine because there was nothing to support the notion
that the officers found it necessary to render aid or medical assistance to
the occupant that was punched in the face.58 Under the circumstances,
the court found that the officers could have only been acting in their law
enforcement capacity, as the officers rendered no aid but certainly made
arrests.59
2.

The United States Supreme Court Vitiates the Intent Requirement

Having lost in the state courts, Utah appealed the decision to the
United States Supreme Court. There, the defendants pointed out once
again that the officers‘ entry was unreasonable and unjustified because
the officers ―were more interested in making arrests than quelling
violence.‖60 The inquiry then went right to the heart of Utah‘s intent
requirement, which allowed the state courts to consider the officers‘
subjective motivations when determining the reasonableness of their
entry. The Supreme Court quickly rejected this approach.
It explained that ―[a]n action is ‗reasonable‘ under the Fourth
Amendment, regardless of the individual officer‘s state of mind, ‗as long
as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.‘‖ 61 In this
way, the Supreme Court made clear that a police officer‘s subjective
motivation for conducting a search is irrelevant in a court‘s Fourth
Amendment analysis.62 Applying this principle to the facts in Stuart, the
Supreme Court concluded that it was objectively reasonable for the
officers to enter the residence and make arrests, as they had every reason
to believe that the individual who was punched in the face might require
help.63 It became clear that objectivity became the Court‘s primary
concern when it stated that ―[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment
required [the officers] to wait until another blow rendered someone
‗unconscious‘ or ‗semi-conscious‘ or worse before entering,‖ given the
officers‘ role to prevent violence and to restore order. 64
Id.
Id. at 514 (―[T]he circumstances known to the officers at the time of entry did not
create a reasonable belief that emergency aid was required.‖). The Utah Supreme Court
went on to discuss the application of the exigent circumstances exception, though for all
present purposes we need not delve into that part of the opinion. Id. at 514–18. Also, two
Justices of the Utah Supreme Court concurred in the majority‘s application of the
emergency aid doctrine, but dissented as to its application of the exigent circumstances
exception. Id. at 518–21. This has no bearing on this Article‘s analysis.
60
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006).
61
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
62
Id.
63
Id. at 406.
64
Id.
58
59
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Justice Stevens concurred in the decision but nevertheless noted that
―[f]ederal interests are not offended when a single State elects to provide
greater protection for its citizens than the Federal Constitution
requires.‖65 He was clearly concerned with the Supreme Court‘s role in
the decision, as he saw it as an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
exercise judicial restraint, as opposed to having the last word in legal
interpretation. For Justice Stevens, there was no need for the Supreme
Court to intervene. He therefore stated that, despite his concurrence
with the majority, he ―remain[ed] persuaded that [his] vote to deny the
State‘s petition for certiorari was correct.‖66
After Brigham City, it was lawful for police officers to enter a house
or building without probable cause so long as they had an objectively
reasonable basis for believing that there was a danger inside. 67 Their
subjective intent was inconsequential. Indeed, armed with an honest
belief regarding some danger, officers could enter a house or building
and dispel that danger regardless of whether their primary motivation
was to gather evidence or to make arrests.68 These pronouncements,
however, would not stay untested for long.
III. MICHIGAN V. FISHER: AFFIRMING WHAT IS OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE
The United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Brigham City
forecasted how the Court would approach similar constitutional
challenges in the future. Intent was no longer part of the analysis, at
least not under federal law. Again, if the defendant challenged an
officer‘s entry under state law, the state court was free to consider the

Id. at 409 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id.; see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1067 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―[It is] my
belief that a policy of judicial restraint—one that allows other decisional bodies to have the
last word in legal interpretation until it is truly necessary for this Court to intervene—
enables this Court to make its most effective contribution to our federal system of
government.‖).
67
Craig M. Bradley, A Sensible Emergency Doctrine, 42 TRIAL 60, 61 (Aug. 2006); see also
United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279, 287 n.2 (6th Cir. 2009) (―[O]nce the police
become aware of a battery, they need not wait to intervene until the threat becomes lifethreatening lest a court hold there was no exigency.‖).
68
Bradley, supra note 67, at 61. Bradley also offers an example in which the exception
would not apply—when ―two officers hear a scream from a nearby apartment and hear
someone say ‗Here‘s Johnny‘ in a menacing voice.‖ Id. at 62. If one officer stops the other
officer from entering the apartment because he knows the voice came from a television
playing the movie The Shining, then it would be unreasonable for the officers to believe a
real emergency is present. Id.; see also Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118 (2006)
(commenting that in a case involving domestic abuse an officer‘s entry would be lawful,
without a warrant or probable cause, if the officer had ―good reason to believe‖ a threat of
domestic violence existed).
65
66
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officer‘s intent in conducting the challenged search and to provide its
citizens greater protections. As Brigham City showed, however, a
challenge under the Fourth Amendment would yield a different result.
To illustrate this point, and to examine how the Supreme Court‘s
role has changed when considering a constitutional challenge from a
state court‘s interpretation of federal law, this section shall explore
closely the Supreme Court‘s decision in Michigan v. Fisher. In doing so,
this section will first examine the rulings in the Michigan state courts and
then provide a detailed analysis of the Supreme Court‘s decision. This
section will also reflect on Justice Stevens‘ dissent, in which he confirms
his sentiment regarding the Supreme Court‘s changing role.
A. Factual History
Fisher involves a rather simple set of facts, which for the most part
are taken from the evidentiary hearing that took place before the
Michigan trial court. At the evidentiary hearing, a single police officer
recounted the incident. He and another officer responded to a residence
after receiving reports of unusual noises and erratic behavior. 69
Apparently, some time prior, a pedestrian approached the officers and
complained that a man was ―going . . . crazy‖ inside a home.70 When the
officers arrived at the residence and exited their vehicle, they
immediately noticed that someone had ―smashed out‖ several of the
residence‘s windows.71 Further, as the officers approached the house
and surveyed the scene outside, they observed that some of the home‘s
fence posts had been damaged and that a nearby truck had its front end
―smashed,‖ as though whoever was driving the truck struck the fence. 72
Upon inspection, the officers saw what they perceived to be fresh blood
on the truck‘s hood and on some clothing that was still inside the truck. 73
People v. Fisher, No. 256027, 2005 WL 3481454, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005). In
2005, the Michigan Appellate Court described the facts according to the criminal complaint
filed with the trial court. Id. at *1 n.1. At this point, the Michigan trial court had not yet
conducted an evidentiary hearing with respect to defendant‘s motion to suppress; it simply
suppressed the evidence from the bench. Id. at *1. Defendant appealed, and the Michigan
Appellate Court determined whether the trial court erred in deciding the issue without an
evidentiary hearing. Id. Ultimately the Appellate Court found that it did. Id. at *2.
70
People v. Fisher, No. 276439, 2008 WL 786515, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2008)
(examining the trial court record). For some reason, the incident‘s factual account differs
from court to court. The facts that we include here attempt to include details that the
Michigan Appellate Court did not mention, while the Michigan trial court did, or vice
versa.
71
Id.
72
Id.; see also Fisher, 2005 WL 3481454, at *1 (describing that a nearby vehicle struck the
fence and was parked near the front door of the residence).
73
Fisher, 2008 WL 786515, at *1.
69
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From outside, the officers could see inside the home. 74 They heard
and saw a man inside ―walking around the residence screaming and
throwing stuff.‖75 One officer added that he could hear objects breaking
inside,76 though he said nothing about the possibility of other
individuals being present inside the home. As the officers advanced,
they again observed what they perceived to be blood on the back door. 77
At that point, one of the officers knocked on the back door and
announced the officers‘ presence, but the man inside the home refused to
answer.78 When the officers persisted, the man responded with
profanity and declared that he would not let the officers in without a
warrant.79 The officers decided to enter.
At the evidentiary hearing, the officer admitted that when the
officers decided to enter the residence they did not know whether there
was anyone else inside. 80 The officers were merely concerned ―[b]ecause
of the amount of blood [the officers] found on the outside‖ of the
residence.81 Notwithstanding this testimony, on cross-examination the
officer admitted that he and the others did not observe a large amount of
blood outside the home, but rather they observed ―mere drops.‖ 82 When
pressed, the officer also admitted ―that he had not known whether
defendant drove the truck at the scene, how the fence was damaged, or
whether anyone in the house actually needed medical assistance.‖ 83
People v. Fisher, 765 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Mich. 2009) (―The officers went to Allen Road and
saw a man later identified as defendant, Jeremy Fisher, through the front window of a
house . . . .‖).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. But see Fisher, 2005 WL 3481454, at *1 (recounting from the criminal complaint, to
which the officer attested, that the officer saw blood on the home‘s front door).
78
Fisher, 2008 WL 786515, at *1.
79
Id. (noting that the man answered with profanity); see also Fisher, 2005 WL 3481454, at
*1 (explaining that the officers induced the defendant ―to state that he would not let them
in if they did not have a warrant‖).
80
Fisher, 2008 WL 786515, at *1.
81
Fisher, 765 N.W.2d at 20 (quoting the trial court testimony) (alteration in original).
82
Fisher, 2008 WL 786515, at *2.
83
Id. Before the evidentiary hearing, Judge Borello strongly disagreed with the
majority‘s decision to send the case back to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary
hearing. Fisher, 2005 WL 3481454, at *3 (Borello, J., dissenting). As to the emergency aid
exception, Judge Borello found it unavailing, noting:
Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that whenever the police
have a basis for supposing that a person has been injured, they are
entitled to enter that person‘s home without a warrant ostensibly to
provide aid. Further, there is no indication that the police inquired
about defendant‘s condition, or observed any injury about him. Nor is
there any suggestion that the police ever suspected that someone else
in the house may have been injured.
74
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Despite all doubt, the officer testified that at some point he noticed a
cut on the man‘s hand.84 It remained unclear, however, when or how the
officer observed the cut because the officers were yet to enter the
residence. Initially, one of the officers pushed open the front door only a
short distance because a piece of furniture blocked the door. 85 The
officer yelled at the man to come to the door; he again responded with
profanities.86 The officers then pushed the door open approximately
twelve to eighteen inches.87 Then, as the testifying officer stepped
forward, he heard a dog bark and looked to his right. 88 At that point he
was able to see inside the home through the glass front door and
observed the man sitting on a bed, raising a rifle, and pointing it directly
at him.89 The officers drew back immediately and left the scene. 90 When
they returned with a warrant, the man surrendered quietly. 91
B. Michigan State Court Findings
Authorities charged the man with assault with a dangerous weapon
and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. 92 Prior to
trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence of what the officers
observed inside the house. The trial court initially granted the motion
without conducting an evidentiary hearing. 93 The trial court was
convinced, based solely on the transcript for the swearing out of the
complaint, that the emergency aid exception did not apply and thus the
officers‘ entry was unlawful.94 The state appealed and the appellate
court remanded the case so that the trial court could conduct a full
evidentiary hearing.95
The second time around, the trial court heard the officers‘ live
testimony and ultimately concluded that ―based on what I‘ve heard here,
Id. at *4.
84
Fisher, 2008 WL 786515, at *1 (―The officer described noticing a cut on defendant‘s
hand.‖).
85
Fisher, 2005 WL 3481454, at *1.
86
Id. (characterizing the man‘s statement as one of ―defiance‖).
87
Id.; People v. Fisher, 765 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Mich. 2009).
88
Fisher, 765 N.W.2d at 20.
89
Id.; Fisher, 2005 WL 3481454, at *1 (noting that the officer ―observed defendant raise a
long gun and point it at him‖).
90
Fisher, 2005 WL 3481454, at *1.
91
Id. (explaining that when the police returned with a search warrant the defendant
surrendered without incident).
92
E.g., People v. Fisher, No. 276439, 2008 WL 786515, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 25,
2008).
93
Fisher, 2005 WL 3481454, at *1.
94
Id.
95
Id.
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I‘m even more convinced‖ that the search involved an unlawful entry.96
Again, the trial court granted the defendant‘s motion to suppress and,
again, the state appealed the judgment. In deciding whether the
emergency aid exception applied, and in affirming the trial court‘s
findings, the appellate court confirmed ―that the situation the police
witness described in this case did not rise to a level of emergency
justifying the warrantless intrusion into a residence.‖97 One of the
justices filed a dissent, however, believing that the evidence was
sufficient to show that it was reasonable for the officer to believe that the
man was in need of assistance, which is all the emergency aid exception
requires.98 For the dissent, it made no difference that the evidence could
not support the existence of an immediate medical emergency, as it was
enough that the officer believed that one existed.99
The state took the case to the Michigan Supreme Court. In the end,
though the Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the parties‘ briefs and
heard oral arguments, it ultimately decided to vacate its prior order that
granted the state‘s application for leave to appeal, thus denying the
application altogether.100 Two justices dissented. One of them simply
stated that it would have reversed the appellate court‘s judgment, citing
the dissenting opinion.101 The other took it a step further, examining the
underlying facts and emphasizing that for the emergency aid exception
to apply, the officers‘ subjective motivations were irrelevant. 102 The
dissent highlighted that after Brigham City, the circumstances, viewed
objectively, must have justified the officers‘ conduct while the officers‘
states of mind were irrelevant.103 Based on the evidence before the trial
court, the dissent explained:
Faced with an irrational and violent man, who was
creating a disturbance and not responding to the police
officers, and a blood trail leading from a truck to the
house, Officer Goolsby could reasonably believe that
someone inside, including defendant, needed medical
assistance. Indeed, as [the prior dissent] observed, ―it

Fisher, 2008 WL 786515, at *2 (quoting the trial court record).
Id.
98
Id. at *4 (Talbot, J., dissenting) (―Given defendant‘s bizarre behavior, it was reasonable
for officers to surmise that he might need medical or psychiatric intervention to prevent
from incurring injury . . . which [may have been] not readily observable . . . .‖).
99
Id.
100
People v. Fisher, 765 N.W.2d 19, 19 (Mich. 2009).
101
Id. (Weaver, J., dissenting).
102
Id. at 21 (Young, J., dissenting).
103
Id. at 21 n.11.
96
97
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was reasonable for officers to surmise that [defendant]
might need medical or psychiatric intervention to
prevent him from incurring injury.‖104
The dissent, in the end, determined that although the drops of blood
on the scene may have indicated only a minor injury, the law after
Brigham City does not require an officer to view or confirm a severe
injury before conducting a search pursuant to the emergency aid
exception.105 Indeed, so long as the officers maintained a reasonable
belief that the defendant or someone inside the home required medical
assistance, the officers‘ entry would be justified under the exception. 106
Accordingly, the dissent suggested a reversal and remand for further
proceedings.107 Seizing the opportunity, the state appealed the judgment
to the United States Supreme Court.
C. United States Supreme Court Review
In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court recounted the facts in
Fisher and worked under the following premise: ―[a] straightforward
application of the emergency aid exception, as in Brigham City, dictates
that the officer‘s entry was reasonable.‖108 To that end, the Court walked
through what it perceived to be several similarities between the facts in
Fisher‘s case and those in Brigham City.109 It noted that in both cases
police officers were responding to a report of some sort of disturbance
and when the officers arrived on the scene ―they encountered a
tumultuous situation in the house.‖110 The Court‘s description of that
―tumultuous situation,‖ however, requires a close examination.
When describing the scene in Fisher, the Supreme Court made much
of the fact that the officers could see Fisher inside the home screaming

Id. at 21 (second alteration in original) (quoting Fisher, 2008 WL 786515, at *4 (Talbot,
J., dissenting)).
105
Id. at 22.
106
Id.; see also Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1998) (―Courts must apply
an objective standard to determine the reasonableness of the officer‘s belief.‖). Tierney had
somewhat of a limited scope, as the court considered the necessity for officers to intervene
in domestic disputes. The court went on to say, ―[c]ourts have recognized the combustible
nature of domestic disputes, and have accorded great latitude to an officer‘s belief that
warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances when the officer had substantial
reason to believe that one of the parties to the dispute was in danger.‖ Tierney, 133 F.3d at
197.
107
Fisher, 765 N.W.2d at 22 (Young, J., dissenting).
108
Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548 (2009).
109
Id. at 548–49.
110
Id. at 548.
104
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and throwing things.111 And though the Court found this similar to the
conduct displayed in Brigham City, the Court ignored an obvious
difference—the officers in Fisher confirmed that they did not see anyone
aside from Fisher inside the home, whereas the officers in Brigham City
witnessed firsthand one individual strike another individual, who then
spat blood in the sink. Ignoring this distinction, the Court determined
that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to assume, merely
because they saw Fisher throwing things, that whatever it was that
Fisher was throwing ―might have a human target.‖ 112 As such, the Court
confirmed that police officers need not have ―ironclad proof of‖ an injury
to invoke the emergency aid exception; they simply must have an
objectively reasonable basis for believing that someone is injured and
requires assistance.113
Subsequently, the Court explained that the Michigan Court of
Appeals erred when it replaced the objective inquiry ―with its hindsight
determination that there was in fact no emergency.‖ 114 The state court, in
essence, required more than the Fourth Amendment demands. Given
the needs of law enforcement, and keeping in mind the demands of
public safety, the Supreme Court stressed that Fisher did not involve the
type of situation from which officers would be required and expected to
walk away.115 In the end, it was objectively reasonable that they did not.
IV. THE EFFECT OF OVERRULING STATE COURTS THAT INTERPRET THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TOO BROADLY
Michigan v. Fisher included one brief dissent. In it, Justice Stevens,
joined by the newly appointed Justice Sotomayor, made clear that he was
not at all pleased with the majority‘s decision to review the case, noting
―it is hard to see how the Court is justified in micromanaging the day-today business of state tribunals making fact-intensive decisions of this

Id. at 549.
Id. The ―projectiles‖ may have been aimed at a spouse or a child, which is rather
speculative because, again, there is nothing in the record to suggest that anyone other than
Fisher was inside the home. Id.
113
Id. (clarifying that ―the test, as we have said, is not what [the officer] believed, but
whether there was ‗an objectively reasonable basis for believing‘ that medical assistance
was needed, or persons were in danger‖) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406
(2006); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978)). We can liken this reasonableness
determination to the arbitrary and capricious standard, which requires an administrative
body to simply have the ability to justify its decision with the facts in the record. If the
facts support its decision, then the district court must affirm.
114
Id.
115
Id.
111
112
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kind.‖116 He went on, saying that the Supreme Court ―ought not usurp
the role of the factfinder when faced with a close question of the
reasonableness of an officer‘s actions, particularly in a case tried in a
state court.‖117 Stevens obviously took issue with the Supreme Court‘s
role in the case. Indeed, he expressed similar frustrations in the past,
most notably in Brigham City v. Stuart, which we examined above. On
several occasions, in fact, Stevens has articulated the same sentiment he
expressed in Fisher—that the Supreme Court was unnecessarily having
the last word in cases where state courts protected their citizens‘ Fourth
Amendment rights too much.118 This practice, says Stevens, departs
from tradition and compromises the Supreme Court‘s conventionally
deferential relationship with the states‘ trial and appellate courts. 119
A. An Effective Contribution
In Stuart, Stevens stressed that a policy of judicial restraint enables
the Supreme Court ―to make its most effective contribution to our
federal system of government.‖120 He borrowed this language from his
thoughtful dissent in Michigan v. Long, a case decided almost two
decades before, in which he saw the opportunity to discuss and outline
the relationship between the federal government and the sovereign
states, specifically the State of Michigan.121 What is more, Stevens raises
an interesting question regarding the allocation of the Supreme Court‘s
resources. In the past, he notes, the Court would not bother with cases in
116
Id. at 550–51 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens hinted that he remained unconvinced
that the state court had gotten it wrong in the first place, and characterized the Supreme
Court‘s conclusion as an ―assumption‖ based on a close question of fact. Id.
117
Id. at 551.
118
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 409 (2006); see also Bonventre, supra note 3, at 846–
47 (noting that the Supreme Court is not reviewing cases in which the states‘ highest courts
have failed to protect their citizens‘ rights and liberties, but cases ―where the Court finds
fault with the state courts for protecting rights and liberties too much‖).
119
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1067 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―The nature of
the case before us hardly compels a departure from tradition.‖); see also Melanie D. Wilson,
The Return of Reasonableness: Saving the Fourth Amendment from the Supreme Court, 59 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1, 32 (2008) (―Given the clear and well-established rule of deference to factfinders‘ determinations, when the Court assesses or re-assesses facts on its way to deciding
whether a search or seizure was reasonable, the Court‘s decisions appear result-oriented.‖).
120
Stuart, 547 U.S. at 409 (Stevens, J., concurring) (―Indeed, I continue to believe ‗that a
policy of judicial restraint—one that allows other decisional bodies to have the last word in
legal interpretation until it is truly necessary for this Court to intervene—enables this Court
to make its most effective contribution to our federal system of government.‘‖) (quoting
Long, 463 U.S. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
121
Long, 463 U.S. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―The case raises profoundly significant
questions concerning the relationship between two sovereigns—the State of Michigan and
the United States of America.‖).
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which the state courts provided greater protections to their own
citizens.122 And when the Supreme Court started to hear these cases,
Stevens tells us that litigants on behalf of the states flooded the Court‘s
docket and requested, at an alarming rate, that the Court reverse state
court judgments in favor of their citizens.123
The issue here, however, is not economic. Stevens is not asserting
that the Supreme Court is wasting its resources in reviewing these cases.
What is happening is that the Supreme Court is overruling cases that
would have had the same outcome if the challenge was brought
pursuant to state law. In other words, in a case involving the emergency
aid exception, if the defendant moved to quash the evidence as a
violation of state law, as opposed to the Fourth Amendment, then the
state court would be free to operate outside the confines of federal law. 124
In this way, the state court can consider the officer‘s motives and intent
while providing greater protections to its citizens and thus shielding
them from what the Supreme Court has defined as ―reasonable.‖125 The
Supreme Court, in the end, would have no reason to review such a case;
thus, a question remains as to why the Supreme Court would see fit to
do so when a Fourth Amendment question is not at stake. 126
Moreover, Stevens reminds us that the traditional role of the
Supreme Court in reviewing state court decisions is to ensure that the
state is providing sufficient rights to its citizens. 127 In the same vein,
scholars have described the Supreme Court as a ―guardian,‖ functioning
as a safeguard of citizens‘ fundamental rights and liberties.128 The Court,

Id. at 1069. Here Stevens recounts that in 1953 the Supreme Court heard only one case
in which the Court reviewed a state court‘s ruling in favor of its citizen. Id. In 1968, the
Court did not review any. Id. Nevertheless, he says, at some point during the late 1970s
the Court‘s ―priorities shifted.‖ Id. at 1069–70.
123
Id. at 1070 (―The result is a docket swollen with requests by States to reverse
judgments that their courts have rendered in favor of their citizens.‖).
124
See Brigham City v. Stuart, 122 P.3d 506, 510 (Utah 2005).
125
See Wilson, supra note 119, at 36 (criticizing generally the Supreme Court‘s assessment
of what is reasonable, arguing that ―the Court‘s case outcomes in cases involving mixed
issues of reasonableness are inconsistent, seemingly result-oriented, and they often defy
common-sense notions of how reasonable citizens respond to police demands‖) (footnote
omitted).
126
See generally Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of StateCourt State-Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80, 82 (2002) (―Indeed, the Court has long
recognized that where a state-court judgment rests on an ‗adequate and independent‘ statelaw ground . . . the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review even a federal question the
state court decided too, no matter how wrong the state court got it.‖).
127
See Long, 463 U.S. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―I believe that in reviewing the
decisions of state courts, the primary role of this Court is to make sure that persons who
seek to vindicate federal rights have been fairly heard.‖).
128
Bonventre, supra note 3, at 844.
122
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in essence, concerned itself with the enforcement of federal constitutional
guarantees, while it did not trouble itself with the correction of state
court decisions that went above and beyond protecting those same
guarantees the first time around. One scholar summarized the problem
as follows:
The Court is declaring emphatically and unambiguously
to state courts: You have no authority to provide more
protection for American Constitutional rights than the
bare minimum. Protect local rights under local law all
you want, the Court is saying, but not those rights and
liberties and freedoms to which the nation as a whole is
dedicated.129
Such a declaration is unfounded in light of the Court‘s traditional role. It
is indeed critical that the Court wrangle less with cases in which citizens‘
rights are ―overprotected‖ and focus more on cases in which those rights
have been abridged. Recognizing that the Court serves as our guardian
of rights and liberties, Stevens‘s concerns become rather compelling. But
there is indeed another concern.
B. The Problem With Reassessing Facts
Fourth Amendment cases, including those that involve the
emergency aid exception, often turn on a close examination of the facts
adduced at the evidentiary hearing.130 The trial court is present to hear
the witnesses and evaluate their demeanor first hand. 131 It is difficult,
then, to truly and properly judge a witness‘s credibility based on a
lifeless record,132 unless of course the record reflects that the witness at

Id. at 852.
See, e.g., Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 764–65 (9th Cir. 2009) (turning to the
alleged facts and finding that the emergency aid exception did not apply because officers
had no reasonable basis to believe that the defendant needed immediate medical attention);
United States v. Venters, 539 F.3d 801, 807–08 (7th Cir. 2008) (examining the trial record
and concluding that warrantless entry was valid where officers had knowledge of a child
inside the premises, which they knew was a dangerous environment used in meth
manufacturing, it was extremely filthy, the defendant was addicted to drugs, and they
were responding to a report of neglect); United States v. Troop, 514 F.3d 405, 410–11 (5th
Cir. 2008) (finding that warrantless entry was unjustified where officers did not observe
blood, physical illness, or any outward signs that someone was carried or dragged).
131
Wilson, supra note 119, at 36.
132
Id. at 36–37 (―Credibility cannot be determined on a cold, written record.‖); see also
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (―When, for example, the issue involves the
credibility of witnesses and therefore turns largely on an evaluation of demeanor, there are
129
130
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some point gave inconsistent testimony. In this light, appellate courts
will often defer to the factual findings of the trial court, which in turn
protects the appellate courts‘ time and resources. 133
More importantly, however, despite the resources that the appellate
court may or may not save, the deference that it gives to the trial courts
cannot be underestimated. In those instances in which the Supreme
Court reviews the facts of a particular case—often for the fourth time on
appeal—it runs the risk of usurping the role of the trial court and
injecting itself into a factual squabble with which it generally has no
interest. And because the Court is not present to see, hear, and consider
the factual presentation first-hand, the Court‘s evidentiary conclusions
and self-serving characterizations, for the most part, will seem ―resultoriented.‖134 This is not to say that the Supreme Court should avoid
reviewing the facts of a particular case. Instead, it should avoid recharacterizing and molding the facts in a way that conflicts with the
lower courts‘ interpretation in an attempt to support the conclusion it
seeks to achieve. When the Court substitutes its judgment for what
happened in a case involving the emergency aid exception, or any
Fourth Amendment determination, the ultimate disposition tends to lose
credibility.135

compelling and familiar justifications for leaving the process of applying law to fact to the
trial court and according its determinations presumptive weight.‖).
133
See Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal
Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 483 (2004) (―A second justification for appellate deference
to lower court findings of fact has to do with the economical use of judicial resources.‖); see
also Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 233, 239-40 (2009) (explaining that the appellate court is most concerned
with ascertaining whether the trial court correctly applied the law, not with determining
the underlying facts, as that would ―result in a poor use of judicial resources‖).
134
Wilson, supra note 119, at 28.
135
Id. at 39 (asserting that when the Court goes beyond its role of establishing clear rules
defining what it means to be reasonable under a particular set of circumstances and instead
second-guesses conclusions of fact finders and evaluating citizens‘ beliefs, ―the Court
reaches problematic results‖). Wilson points out that the fact finders also benefit from
understanding the local customs in the region in which they sit, and that appellate courts,
which are removed from that region, ―cannot replicate these experiences and are, therefore,
at a disadvantage to decide factual issues accurately and fairly.‖ Id. at 37. I personally
question the importance of local custom, though Wilson makes a fair point. Kenneth
Brown critiques appellate courts by stating as follows:
Most trial judges will not substitute their judgment for that of the
jury‘s because of respect for and deference to the integrity of the fact
finding process. Yet, appellate courts in the name of harmless error
have no hesitation in trampling that fact finding process to reach a
result they consider correct, regardless of the right affected.
Kenneth R. Brown, Constitutional Harmless Error or Appellate Arrogance, 6 UTAH B.J. 18, 20
(Jan. 1993).
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Moreover, the practice of deferring to the lower courts‘ factual
findings and reasonableness determinations in Fourth Amendment cases
preserves the integrity of the state trial and appellate courts.136 There is
no need for the Supreme Court to reverse the state courts when they do
no harm to their state citizens. 137 Such cases generally involve only state
actors. And, again, there is no violation of those state actors‘ federal
constitutional rights. Rather, these cases involve a constitutional right
that the state courts have either protected or redressed, and it is that
protection that the state asks the Supreme Court to limit. 138 Proper
deference to the facts that the lower courts have considered and
developed not only creates a more efficient judicial system, but it also
allows the Supreme Court to return to its traditional function, as the
lower courts enjoy their traditional function. There simply is no need to
disrupt this relationship.
V. CONCLUSION
In Michigan v. Fisher, the United State Supreme Court reversed the
state courts‘ findings that the emergency aid exception did not justify a
group of officers‘ warrantless entry into the defendant‘s home. In doing
so, the Court neither pronounced new law regarding the Fourth
Amendment nor did it enforce any federal constitutional guarantees. To
be sure, there were not any rights or liberties at stake. Instead, the Court
simply disagreed with the state courts‘ determinations that their own
citizens should be afforded greater protections than federal law required.
Justice Stevens has taken issue with similar decisions in the past and has
made clear that the Supreme Court operates in an inefficient manner
when it departs from its traditional role. The Court generally had no
interest in these types of cases but nevertheless began injecting itself into
factual determinations and disagreeing with the conclusions of the state
Mark A. Bross, Comment, The Impact of Ornelas v. United States on the Appellate
Standard of Review for Seizure Under the Fourth Amendment, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 871, 877
(2007) (―Deference to the trial court‘s findings of fact . . . minimizes the risk of judicial error
by assigning decision-making responsibility to the court that is best-suited to make the
decision.‖).
137
Perhaps a more prudent order of the Supreme Court would be to vacate the lower
court‘s decision with instructions as to the proper standard it need apply on remand. See
Sena Ku, Comment, The Supreme Court’s GVR Power: Drawing A Line Between Deference and
Control, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 409 (2008) (explaining that vacating and remanding can be
viewed as a training instrument to make state courts ―more accountable, efficient, and
‗accurate‘ in deciding points of law‖) (quoting Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 168
(1996)). This preserves the trial court‘s integrity somewhat, though there is still no need to
vacate a decision when a state court simply protects its citizens too much; thus, our
concerns here still would exist.
138
Bonventre, supra note 3, at 851–52.
136
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courts. If we view the Supreme Court as a guardian of rights and
liberties, this practice simply does not make sense. This practice is one
that the Supreme Court can easily curb, and ought to curb, so that it can
once again ensure, without distraction, that our constitutional rights are
adequately protected.
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